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Abstract. While there is a clear need to apply data analytics in the healthcare sector, 
this is often difficult because it requires combining sensitive data from multiple data 
sources. In this paper, we show how the cryptographic technique of secure multi-
party computation can enable such data analytics by performing analytics without 
the need to share the underlying data. We discuss the issue of compliance to 
European privacy legislation; report on three pilots bringing these techniques closer 
to practice; and discuss the main challenges ahead to make fully privacy-preserving 
data analytics in the medical sector commonplace. 
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1. Introduction 
The need to better use data analytics in the healthcare sector is nowadays well-understood. 
With healthcare costs already high and expected to rise even more (10% of the GDP of 
the European Union already and estimated to rise by 30% by 2060), it is important to 
control costs while not compromising on quality and access. The use of knowledge that 
is hidden in existing medical data (of which already zettabytes are available, soon rising 
to yottabytes) is seen as the “fastest, least costly, and most effective path to improving 
people’s health” [3] and may lead to cost savings of over $250M in the US alone [4]. 
Gaining insights from medical data typically requires working with very sensitive 
data, often from multiple data sources. This can be within organisations (for instance, 
combining medical records in a hospital with real-time data from a tracking system); 
between organisations in the same vertical of the healthcare sector (for instance, using 
insights in the effectiveness of treatments for particular patient types across hospitals); 
or even between organisations in different verticals (for instance, combining data from 
hospitals and insurance companies to link medical data to data about treatment costs). 
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 Unfortunately, while big data analytics in the healthcare sector is very relevant, it is 
also very challenging because it needs to be applied to very sensitive data. With recent 
stories about data breaches in mind (e.g., [8]), both healthcare organisations and patients 
are rightly reluctant to have their data being used for analytics. At the same time, the 
upcoming EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requires a high standard for 
data security, consent, and other measures to be in place before personal information is 
even allowed to be processed. As a result, for many healthcare organisations, “fears about 
data release outweigh their hope of using the information” [4]. 
In this paper, we show how the cryptographic technique of secure multi-party 
computation (MPC) can enable new data analytics applications by performing data 
analytics without the need to share the underlying data. As a consequence, data providers 
can contribute data to an analysis while being technically guaranteed that the data cannot 
be de-anonymised (e.g., [2]), decrypted, or used for any other purpose than the intended 
one. We demonstrate the potential of this technology by discussing three ongoing pilots: 
one inside a hospital, one between hospitals and one between a hospital and an insurance 
company. We also discuss the main technical and non-technical hurdles we see before 
these techniques can be applied in practice at a large scale. 
This paper is structured as follows. We introduce privacy-preserving data mining 
based on MPC in Section 2, and discuss its relation to EU privacy legislation in Section 
3. In Section 4, we discuss the three pilot projects. In Section 5, we discuss the outlook 
for MPC, including challenges to make privacy-preserving data analytics become reality. 
2. Privacy-Preserving Data Mining based on Secure Multi-Party Computation 
In the medical domain, there is a frequent need to perform data mining on sensitive data 
(e.g., medical/financial data), raising data sharing challenges that privacy-preserving 
data mining (PPDM) aims to address. PPDM traditionally assumes that there is one data 
owner, and aims at anonymizing data such that third parties can still mine patterns from 
it. Various anonymisation techniques are known, e.g., based on k-anonymity or 
differential privacy; but they generally reduce utility, and in many cases, partial de-
anonymisation of supposedly anonymised datasets turned out to be possible [2]. 
PPDM using secure multi-party computation (MPC), introduced 17 years ago in a 
seminal paper by Lindell and Pinkas [6], goes beyond traditional techniques by assuming 
that multiple parties with confidential datasets want to mine their combined data. This 
data may be distributed horizontally (parties have the same kind of information on 
different data subjects) or vertically (parties have different kinds of information on the 
same data subjects). In the horizontal case, global analytics can often be approximated 
by locally computing aggregates and then combining them [5], but this does not work in 
the vertical case. In such cases, MPC allows analytics by distributing each sensitive data 
item between multiple processors who interact using a cryptographic protocol. 
One main technique in such protocols is secret sharing, of which we give a simple 
example. Suppose three doctors want to know the total number of patients they treated, 
without sharing their individual subtotals. To do this, doctor 1 takes his subtotal x, adds 
a large random number, r, to it (chosen randomly, say, between 0 and 1000000), and 
sends x+r to doctor 2. Note that r “statistically hides” x from doctor 2. Doctor 2 then 
adds his subtotal, y, to the running total and sends x+r+y to doctor 3, who similarly adds 
his subtotal, z, and sends x+r+y+z to Doctor 1. Doctor 1 subtracts r and reveals the end 
result, x+y+z. Note that secrets (x,y,z) are hidden by randomness (r) and a computation 
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 is performed by exchanging randomised values between the participants. This basic 
principle can be used to perform any computation while only revealing its end result [6]. 
Other popular techniques are threshold and/or homomorphic encryption. 
3. Legal framework for privacy-preserving data mining 
Two aspects of the upcoming GDPR are particularly relevant for privacy-enhancing 
techniques (PETs) such as MPC. First, using state-of-the-art PETs, partially anonymised 
(pseudonymous or encrypted) personal data may qualify as anonymous data. According 
to the GDPR, data is personal if it contains any information relating to an identified or a 
directly or indirectly identifiable natural person. If a set of personal data has been fully 
anonymized, i.e. there is no mean reasonably likely to be used to identify any individual, 
the data will no longer be treated like personal data, and will not be subject to the GDPR. 
A limitation is that a potential possibility of an unauthorized access always has to be 
taken into account, but only if the means used are reasonably likely [1]. 
Second, the GDPR introduces a new definition for consent. Organizations that rely 
on the consent of data subjects as a lawful basis of processing are particularly affected, 
since the GDPR demands an explicit, unambiguous, specific informed consent given by 
a statement or clearly affirmative action in an opt-in mechanism. Controllers must in 
addition carefully evaluate the purposes of processing and are not allowed to collect data 
extensively. Data protection by design and by default set out the obligation for data 
processing systems to embed technical and organizational measures and integrate 
safeguards from the outset. So, while new PETs may introduce complex data protection 
risks, with minimizing the use of personal data they have a potential to reduce those risks. 
4. Pilot projects 
4.1. Privacy-preserving data collection: tracking staff and patients 
Our first pilot, executed in a consortium including Philips and TNO, aims to apply MPC 
to put employees in charge of their location data in a hospital setting. Optimizing hospital 
workflows can help improve resource utilisation, reduce operational costs and, most 
importantly, improve quality of care. Traditionally, to find process improvements, 
consultants interview various stakeholders and patients, and spend days shadowing key 
staff members and patients in order to develop an accurate picture of how the hospital is 
functioning. However, individuals often tend to modify their natural behaviour the 
moment they are conscious about the fact that they are being observed (the Hawthorne 
effect). Also, as consultants are usually limited in numbers and do not stay at the hospital 
24 hours a day, they are unable to get a global view of a department’s operations. 
One option to address this is to tag relevant staff members, patients and assets with 
a Real-Time Locating System (RTLS) which provides location information of all tagged 
entities every few seconds. However, while such systems can make a detailed and 
objective assessment of hospital operations, staff members are often reluctant to use 
RTLS as sharing their location data with hospital management is considered an invasion 
of privacy. Hence we propose for the hospital to only have access to location data of 
patients. Staff location data is made available only to staff members themselves, or to the 
worker’s council that represents them. Using MPC, data analytics can be performed on 
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 two (patient location data from the hospital and staff location data from the worker’s 
council) or more data streams (patient location data from the hospital and staff location 
from each staff member). This way, staff members are put in control of their location 
data, individual data is never opened, and secondary use of their data is made impossible.  
4.2. Intra-sector data analytics: analysing population health 
The second pilot, part of the Horizon 2020 SODA project, is about performing joint 
analysis using data from different data providers in the same sector. The pilot focusses 
on prediction of population health, for instance to predict the risk of death within one 
year for chronic heart failure patients using logistic regression: such a model benefits 
from data from different regions or countries. Using MPC, the model (i.e., the logistic 
regression coefficients) can be built without hospitals needing to share any data about 
their patients. Other typical tasks include decision tree learning and computing statistics. 
Compared to the single-organization case, this one is a lot more complex to deploy. 
A first challenge is to make organisations and data subjects willing to share their data. 
MPC should help with this by helping towards GDPR compliance and reducing the risk 
of unauthorized data re-use of the data. Other challenges include agreeing on common 
formats for data exchange and in interpreting concepts in a common way (in one case, 
conflicting definitions of “mortality rate” caused practical problems); and in formulating 
models, and dealing with outliers and missing data, without needing to inspect the data. 
4.3. Inter-sector data analytics  
The third pilot, by an academic hospital (Erasmus MC), a health-care insurance company 
(Achmea), and TNO in the Horizon 2020 BigMedilytics project, aims to shorten the 
lifecycle between research and clinical practice by combining data from multiple 
verticals, thus improving healthcare efficiency. In particular, the pilot combines 
population data, patient profiles, patient care, and financial claim data. One application 
is comorbidity-based risk stratification for heart failure patients. The expectation is that 
combining clinical data from the hospital with cardiovascular comorbidity information 
based on claims data from the insurance company leads to better treatment outcomes. 
The main challenges for this pilot are, again, achieving GDPR compliance (toward 
which the use of MPC will contribute); but also ISO 27001 certification and linking the 
data from the various pockets, silos, and scientific software applications in the different 
institutions. In particular, for clinical data, this will be achieved through a link with the 
new electronic patient dossier, HiX, for which first steps have already been taken. 
5. Conclusion, Challenges, and Outlook 
As we aim to show in three pilots in the medical domain, secure multi-party computation 
enables data analytics on data from multiple providers, without requiring them to share 
data with anybody else. However, to make this vision a commonplace reality, several 
technical and non-technical challenges need to be addressed, which we now discuss. 
A first challenge is integration with other systems. While building isolated MPC 
prototypes is possible, collecting data and inserting it into a MPC system today is largely 
a manual process. To simplify the use of MPC, it needs to be integrated with existing 
systems. This includes adding MPC to healthcare information standards like FHIR, and 
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 working together with initiatives such as the Dutch Personal Health Train (PHT) 
initiative based on FAIR [7] data. A second step is to develop new techniques for 
checking consistency between datasets without manual inspection of the underlying data. 
A second challenge is scalability. In theory, MPC can be applied to any kind of 
computation; in practice, its overhead compared to in-the-plain processing is large. For 
instance, performing regression on hundreds of millions of records using state-of-the-art 
techniques requires around 10 hours to complete. Solution directions include more 
scalable primitives, parallelisation, streaming, and mixing plain and hidden data. 
A third challenge is GDPR compliance. The GDPR undoubtedly gives rise to several 
issues related to data processing with privacy-preserving techniques. Anonymisation 
may be a good strategy to benefit from big data, and to mitigate the data protection risks. 
It is highly probable that data which are de-identified with application of state-of-the-art 
PETs will fall outside the scope of the GDPR. However, large-scale processing of 
sensitive personal data is generally of greater risks, since sensitive personal data are 
subject to additional protections. Hence, a risk-based, multi-factor compliance analyses 
is advised in any case to ensure that data processing routines are compliant with the new 
requirements of the GDPR. Especially, because the legal evaluation of data processing 
activities will in any event be subject to a case-by-case assessment. 
A final challenge is gaining trust from key stakeholders. Having technically sound 
solutions is just a first step towards convincing stakeholders (including patients, hospital 
staff, and information officers) to enable privacy-preserving data analytics on their data. 
Easy-to-understand ways of explaining cryptographic techniques in data analytics are 
needed. Moreover, rigorous qualitative and quantitative user studies are needed to better 
comprehend the concerns of stakeholders and their understanding of the issues involved.  
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